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Comments
Eroding Roe: The Politics And
Constitutionality of California's Parental
Consent Abortion Statute*
In the 1973 decision Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme
Court upheld the qualified constitutional right of women to obtain
abortions. 2 The Court limited the states' traditional powers to decide
whether or not women could have access to the procedure. 3 The Roe
decision held that a woman may have an abortion without interfer-
ence from the state until approximately the end of the first trimester
of her pregnancy.4 After that point, only a state's "legitimate inter-
ests" in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman
and the "potentiality of human life" could qualify the abortion
* This comment was originally written as part of the Stauffer Research Series. The
Stauffer Research Series represents the published products of the John Stauffer Fellowship
Program,conducted under the auspices of the Center for Research at the University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Funded by a generous endowment by the John Stauffer
Charitable Trust, the Program was conceived in 1976 as one which would support faculty-
supervised student research into legal topics of significance to California.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Abortions or miscarriages caused by disease or injury to a pregnant woman are
described as "spontaneous." See generally Comment, Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers: Medi-Cal Funding of Abortion, 9 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 361, 366 n.43
(1978) (providing definitions of common abortion-related medical terms). The term "abortion,"
when used in this comment, will refer only to an induced abortion.
3. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139. See infra text accompanying notes 33-64 (describing the legal
history of the availability of abortions in the United States).
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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right.5 Nevertheless the controversy over the powers of the states to
restrict abortion rights has continued.
6
The abortion battle has recently focused on the rights of minors
to obtain abortions. 7 California Health and Safety Code section 25958
is one of many statutes enacted by various states to restrict this right
of minors.8 The statute forbids an abortion to be performed on an
unemancipated9 minor without the consent of a parent or a judicial
determination of her maturity or "best interest."' 1 The provisions of
this enactment, if upheld by California courts, will inhibit the exercise
by mature minors of their rights to obtain abortions." The parental
or judicial consent law was to take effect on January 1, 1988, and
5. Id. at 162. A state may prohibit abortions after the point of fetal viability except to
preserve a pregnant woman's life or health. Id. at 163-64. See infra note 33 (providing
definition of viability).
6. See generally K. LER, ABORTION AND THE PouLcs OF MOTHERHOOD, in CALIoRIA
SERIES ON SocIAL CHOICE AND PoLricAL ECONOMY (1984) (explaining why the opposing
positions in the abortion debate are held with such fervor and why the abortion issue is so
divisive in America today). "Even on the local level, once-sleepy school boards have become
tumultuous when asked to consider the place of abortion in sex education curricula, and
zoning boards have split over whether an abortion clinic should be permitted to operate in a
community." Id. at 1 (citing Abortion Clinic Zoning: The Right to Procreative Freedom and
the Zoning Power, WoMEN's Rrs. L. REP., 5 (1979)).
7. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 25 (West 1982) (a minor is any person under 18 years of age).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAsmr CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1989) (enacted by 1987 Cal. stat.
ch. 1237 see. 3, at._). These enactments take the form of parental "notification" or
"consent" statutes. "Notification" statutes require a parent of a pregnant unemancipated
minor to be notified about the minor's abortion. "Consent" statutes, like section 25958,
require a parent of a pregnant minor to consent to the child's abortion. See Bonavoglia,
Kathy's Day in Court, Ms., April 1988, at 46, 51 (thirteen states have enacted parental
"notification" statutes, eight of which have been enjoined and two of which are inactive and
unconstitutional. Twenty-one states, including California, have passed parental "consent"
statutes, seven of which have been enjoined and seven of which are inactive and unconstitu-
tional). See also Cal. Senate, Health and Human Services Comm. [hereinafter H.H.S. Staff
Analysis of A.B. 2274] at 2 (June 25, 1987) (Health and Safety Code section 25958 is similar
to the following: (1) Senate Bill 2230 (Speraw, 1984) which failed in the Senate Committee on
Health and Human Services in 1985, (2) Senate Bill 7 (Montoya, 1985) which passed that
committee but failed in the Assembly in 1986, and (3) Senate Bill 11 (Montoya, 1987) which
was introduced but not heard in 1987. Id. In the 1987 Legislative Session, four parental
consent bills were introduced in the California Legislature: (1) Assembly Bill 2274 (Frazee),
(2) Senate Bill 11 (Montoya), (3) Assembly Bill 77 (Wyman), and (4) Assembly Bill 67
(Isenberg).
9. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 62 (West 1982) (an emancipated minor is one who has entered
a valid marriage, is on active duty in the United States armed forces or has been declared
emancipated by a superior court pursuant to California Civil Code section 64). See also id. §
64 (a minor must be at least 14 years old and meet other specified requirements to be declared
emancipated by a superior court). See generally Comment, California's Emancipation of
Minors Act: The Costs and Benefits of Freedom From Parental Control, 18 CAL. W.L. Rv.
482 (1982) (describing the provisions and effects of the 1978 California Emancipation of
Minors Act).
10. CAL. HEALTH & SAsavr CODE § 25958(c) (West Supp. 1989).
11. According to records of the State of California Department of Health Services,
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has been enjoined pending determination of the statute's constitu-
tionality under both the federal and California constitutions. 12
The purpose of this comment is to establish that the sexual privacy
rights of mature minors under the California Constitution would be
violated by the enforcement of section 25958. This comment will
first describe the language of section 25958 and the history of
abortions in the United States. 3 Next, it will analyze the right of
privacy of female minors under the federal Constitution in view of
competing state and parental interests in their welfare.1 4 Then it will
highlight the significance to pregnant minors of the explicit right of
privacy provided by the California Constitution.' 5 Finally, this com-
ment will suggest another scheme which would better accommodate
all three competing interests: (1) The right of sexual privacy of female
minors in California; (2) the state's interest in the well-being of
minors; and (3) the rights of parents to raise their children. 16
I. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 25958
The language of California Health and Safety Code Section 25958
explicitly erects legal hurdles that an unemancipated minor must clear
in order to have an abortion.' 7 Section 25958 specifies that for a
pregnant unemancipated minor to receive an abortion, the minor
Medical Care Statistic Section, approximately 34,367 abortions were performed for minors
who were age seventeen or younger in 1985. This number represents an estimated 11,3% of
all abortions performed in California for patients of all ages. See A. Torres, J.D. Forrest and
S. Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and
Abortion Services, 12 FAz. PLAN. PERsp., No. 6 (November/December 1980) (approximately
55% of all abortion patients who are 17 or younger said that their parents knew of their
abortions). Of the 1,170 surveyed patients, 9% said they would have a self-induced or illegal
abortion if forced to notify their parents. Id. Nine percent of the minors said that they would
bear their babies if forced to notify their parents. Id. See also Los ANGELES DAILY J., Jan.
5, 1988, at 8 (describing the short and long-term effects on the total number of abortions
obtained by minors in Utah, Rhode Island and Minnesota after those states enacted their
parental notice and consent laws). Short-term teen abortion rates in all three states dipped or
remained steady. Only in Rhode Island did long-term levels of teen abortions drop, and then
only for 16-17 year-olds. Id.
12. The statute received its first legal challenge in December of 1988 in San Francisco
Superior Court, where it was enjoined pending a full trial review of the constitutional
implications involved. San Francisco Chronicle, February 26, 1988, at 14. On February 25,
1988, the California Supreme Court refused to overturn the injunction, allowing the issue to
first be heard by lower courts. Id.
13. See infra notes 17-64 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 65-194 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 195-301 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 302-21 and accompanying text.
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAEsT"Y CODE § 25958(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1989).
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must obtain the written consent of a parent or legal guardian. 8 A
minor who cannot obtain that consent or who elects not to inform
a parent or guardian may file with a juvenile court a petition to
obtain permission to have an abortion.19 This mechanism is known
as a "judicial bypass" procedure. 20 Any person who performs an
abortion on a minor who does not satisfy the requirements of section
25958 is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punished by a fine of
up to $1,000, or up to thirty days in a county jail.21
Section 25958 provides that the hearing must be set within three
days after the petition is filed.22 The juvenile court must maintain
the confidentiality of the minor's identity. 23 Although the juvenile
court must inform the minor that she has the right to court-appointed
counsel at her request,24 the minor may participate in the juvenile
court proceedings on her own behalf. 25 The juvenile court must
consider all evidence presented at the abortion authorization hearing
and make one of three findings.
26
First, the juvenile court may find that the minor is sufficiently
mature and informed to make the decision on her own and has
consented to the abortion on that basis.27 In that case, the court
must grant its authorization.2 Second, the juvenile court may find
the minor not sufficiently mature and informed to make the abortion
decision. In that event, the court must consider whether the perform-
ance of the abortion would be in the best interest of the minor. 29 A
juvenile court that decides that the procedure would be in the minor's
best interest must grant the petition without the consent of, or notice
to, the minor's parents or guardian.
30
18. Id. (except for a medical emergency requiring immediate medical action). See generally
Review of Selected 1987 California Legislation, 19 PAc. L.J. 646 (1988) (describing the
provisions of Health & Safety Code section 25958).
19. CAL. HE.mA & SAr CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1989) (the juvenile court must
assist the minor or person designated by the minor in preparing the petition and notices
required by the statute).
20. Id. (the petition must specifically present the minor's reasons for the request).
21. Id. § 25958(0.
22. Id.
23. Id. (the minor may file the petition using only her initials or a pseudonym).
24. Id. No fees or costs incurred by the procedures required by section 25958 are to be
chargeable to the minor or her parents or guardian. Id. § 25958(e).
25. Id. (and the juvenile court may appoint a guardian ad litem for her).
26. See id. § 25958(c)(2) (the judgment must be entered within one court day of the
submission of the matter).
27. Id. § 25958(c)(1).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 25958(c)(2).
30. Id.
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Third, the juvenile court may find that the pregnant minor is not
sufficiently mature or informed to make the abortion decision and
that an abortion would not be in her best interest. If the court so
finds, it must deny the minor's petition. 31 The minor may appeal the
judgment.3 2 The social implications of these provisions can be best
determined by analyzing them within an historical framework.
II. A SUMMARY OF TB:E LEGAL HISTORY OF ABORTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
A review of historical legal attitudes towards abortions shows that
section 25958 contradicts traditional American legal views. The com-
mon law allowed a pregnant woman free access to an abortion until
the woman's fetus was found viable. 33 Not until the mid-nineteenth
century were criminal abortion statutes enacted.3 4 By 1900 every state
had prohibited all abortions except those necessary to save the life
of an endangered pregnant woman. 35 Concern for the health of
pregnant women ostensibly motivated these prohibitions,3 6 but cul-
31. Id.
32. Id. § 25958(d) (by filing a written appeal any time after the initial judgment). Judgment
must be entered within one court day after submission of the petition of appeal. Id. The
appellate hearing must be set within 5 days after the finding for the appeal. Id. Section 25958
does not specify the practice and procedure on these appeals or the time and manner in which
any record on appeal must be prepared and filed, but instead directs the State Judicial Council
to do so. Id.
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). The Court accepted the definition of viability
as the point at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit
with artificial aid," and is presumably capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's
womb." Id. Viability usually occurs at about the seventh month of pregnancy, although it
may occur earlier. Id. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65 (1976)
(approving Missouri statutory, definition of viability). The Missouri statute defined viability as
"that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." Id. at 63. The determination
of the viability of a particular fetus is properly that of the attending physician. Id. at 64.
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138 (Connecticut, in 1821, was the first state to prohibit abortions
by women with "quick" fetuses). At common law, "quickening" was defined as "the first
recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th
week of pregnancy." Id. at 132. New York enacted a statute in 1828 that was to become a
model anti-abortion statute for the other states. Id. at 138. The New York statute made the
abortion of a quick fetus a felony offense and the abortion of a fetus that had not quickened
a misdemeanor. Id. An abortion necessary to protect a pregnant woman's health was not
penalized by the legislation. Id. Legislators during the latter half of the nineteenth century
began ignoring the quickening distinction and increased penalties for non-life-threatening
abortions. Id. at 139.
35. K. LuKrR, supra note 6, at 15.
36. See Comment, supra note 2, at 364 (anti-abortion publicity focused on stories of the
deaths and mutilations of women caused by abortion procedures, despite the fact that "any
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tural themes and social struggles lay beneath the changes.37 For nearly
70 years legal access to the procedure was controlled by the medical
profession's power to determine when a pregnant woman's life was
"endangered."38
By the end of the 1950's, most states forbade access to an abortion
unless a woman's health39 or life was at risk.4° Some states, however,
began liberalizing their abortion policies during the 1960's. 41 The
trend setters were Colorado, North Carolina, California and New
York.42 In the several years before the Roe decision, about one-third
of the states had enacted more liberal abortion statutes. 43
Proponents of the right to obtain abortions have organized "pro-
choice" groups while opponents of these rights describe themselves
as "pro-life." These two forces hold polarized emotional philoso-
surgery performed in the nineteenth century was highly dangerous") (emphasis in original);
Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom ... , 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 383 (1971) (although
abortion laws were enacted to protect the lives of women from dangerous surgical procedures,
states continued to enforce them even after the advent of antiseptic techniques made abortions
safer than childbirth).
37. K. LUKER, supra note 6, at 15. See Comment, supra note 2, at 363 (other forces that
combined to support anti-abortion laws were the following: (1) A declining birthrate caused
by the change from a mainly rural and agricultural economy to an urban and industrialized
one; (2) the efforts of physicians of the period to upgrade their professional status as evinced
by the emergence of the American Medical Association, which condemned abortions; (3) the
use of abortion as a means of birth control by married and upper-class women; (4) a popular
backlash to the suffragist and women's movements; and (5) communities' reactions to increas-
ingiy bold advertising and publicity by abortionists). Id.
38. See K. LUKER, supra note 6, at 67-68.
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139 (1973) (Alabama and the District of Columbia were
unique in allowing an abortion to save a woman's health, and not just to preserve her life).
See also D.CAmPBELL, DoctoRs, LAwYERs, MN4isT-Rs: CiRusuAN ETmIcs IN PRosassloNAL
PRACTICE 114 (1982) (circumstances for which a pregnant woman's health was deemed in
danger included those in which the woman was the victim of rape, incest or mental abuse).
40. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139 n.34 (citing Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and
Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems, U. Ill. L.F. 177, 179 (1972)
(in 1961, 25 states permitted abortions to save or preserve a woman's life).
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 (most of these "liberal" abortion statutes were patterned after
the American Legal Institute (A.L.I.) Model Penal Code section 230.3). See Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 205-07 app. B (1973) (the appendix includes a copy of the A.L.I. abortion
statute that distinguished legal "justified" abortions from "unjustified" abortions which were
illegal). A physician could "justify" an abortion by determining that the procedure would
prevent "grave impairment" of the pregnant woman's physical or mental health, or that the
child would be born with a mental or physical defect or that the pregnancy resulted from
"rape, incest or other felonious intercourse." Id. at 205.
42. D. CAMPBELL, supra note 39, at 114.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37.
44. See Comment, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Procreative Choice
Guaranteed for all Women, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 691, 691 n.3 (1982) (describing the
individuals and groups comprising these coalitions). See also K. LUKER, supra note 6, at 194-
95 "On almost every social background variable [that was] examined, pro-life and pro-choice
women differed dramatically." Id. For example, the majority of pro-life women surveyed
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phies regarding the morality of abortions, making political compro-
mise on abortion issues unlikely.45 The national pro-life movement
is composed of a mix of churches, 46 fundamental religious organi-
zations and conservative political groups. 47 Most of these operate
under the umbrella of the National Right to Life Committee. 48 Major
pro-choice organizations include the American Civil Liberties Union
(A.C.L.U.), Planned Parenthood and the National Organization of
Women.
49
Both pro-life and pro-choice groups recognize that many abortion
regulations are parts of a broader effort to limit and undermine the
Roe decision.50 Pro-life forces have made significant political efforts
to limit and overturn the constitutional right of women to obtain
abortions. Members of pro-life organizations lobbied for the federal
adoption of the "Hyde Amendment"51 which prohibits Medicaid
reported incomes significantly higher than those of pro-choice women. Id. Moreover, of the
pro-choice women surveyed, "a considerable portion" of those women were just starting their
careers. Id. at 194. Ninety-four percent of all pro-choice women surveyed work in the paid
labor force, compared to 37% of pro-life women. Id. at 195. In addition, surveyed pro-life
women generally had "far less education" than surveyed pro-choice women. These figures
show a "very complex social reality" of differences between the women of each side of the
abortion issue. Id. Luker emphasizes the different interests a woman has in reproductive rights
issues, based on her socio-economic background.
45. See K. LUKER, supra note 6, at xiii "While the militants on both sides would have
us believe that the abortion debate is actually very simple, such simplicity is both a necessity
and a luxury for them." Id. By simplifying the issues of the abortion debate, each faction
can instill a sense of righteousness necessary to motivate its believers. This also allows each
group's believers the luxury of avoiding the real human dilemmas involved. Id.
46. See H.H.S. Staff Analysis of A.B. 2274, supra note 8, at 7-8 (church organizations
supporting the enactment of the California consent law include the Christian Action Council
of Southern California and the California Catholic Conference, among others). See also D.
CAmx'anE, supra note 39 at 116 (1982) (the coalition also includes Roman Catholics, Orthodox
Jews and Evangelicals). But see H.H.S. Staff Analysis of A.B. 2274, supra note 8 at 8-9
(religious organizations opposing the law include the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights
of Northern California, Mormons for Choice, the National Council of Jewish Women and
the Young Women's Christian Association).
47. See H.H.S. Staff Analysis of A.B. 2274, supra note 8, at 8-9 (some notable politically
conservative groups supporting the consent law include the Committee on Moral Concerns,
the Traditional Values Coalition, the Eagle Forum, the Women's Lobby and the Knights of
Columbus). But see id. at 8 (Republicans for Choice opposed the law).
48. See Comment, supra note 44, at 691 n.3 (the National Right to Life Committee is an
umbrella group with over 11,000,000 members and affiliates in all fifty states that organize,
fund, and sponsor statewide anti-abortion efforts).
49. See H.H.S. Staff Analysis of A.B. 2274, supra note 8, at 8 (other notable opponents
of the law include the California Judges Association, the State Bar of California, the Judicial
Council of California, the California Chapter of National Association of Social Workers, the
American Academy of Pediatrics and the California Commission on the Status of Women).
50. Cf. Comment, supra note 2, at 372, (citing Schulte, Tax Supported Abortions: The
Legal Issues, 21 CATH. LAW. 1, 1 (1975) (describing attempts by pro-life forces and agencies
to "keep the impact of these abortion decisions within the narrowest possible confines").
51. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 1311, 68 stat. 1434 (1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965)).
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funding of most abortions5 2 drafted a constitutional amendment to
prohibit abortions, 3 and convinced legislators to pass legislation to
restrict access to abortions.5 4 Despite the efforts and successes of
these lobbyists, however, the American public is becoming more
sympathetic to abortion all the time."
Since 1973, the Court has twice strongly reaffirmed Roe. In City
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,16 the Court
enumerated the "especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare
decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. ' '57 In Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,-" the Court,
although divided 5-4, refused to retreat from Roe. 9 Justice Blackmun,
52. Id. The amendment, which has taken several forms, restricts funding through the
Medicaid program of the Social Security Act for abortions not threatening the life of a
pregnant woman. Id. The United States Supreme Court, in addressing the constitutional issues
raised by this legislation, has held that abortion rights entail only the freedom from direct
governmental constraints on the availability of the procedure, not the universal economic
ability to obtain an abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the federal
constitutionality of the "Hyde Amendment"). See also Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358
(1980) (federal statutes do not require payment for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (payments for most abortions may be denied poor women); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977) (the Social Security Act does not require payments for these abortions); Poelker v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (a city-funded hospital may provide free child birth assistance
without providing corresponding services for most abortions). Compare Perry, Why the
Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113
(1980) (McRae, which took the constitutionally impermissible view that abortion is morally
wrong, is "radically inconsistent" with Roe) with Westin, Correspondence, 33 STAN. L. REv.
1187 (1981) (responding that Perry's premises are wrong since Roe "merely prohibited the
states from taking any action premised on moral objections to abortion"); compare Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975) (supporting the Court's protection of fundamental rights
but not economic equality) with Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependance, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1985) (the
government's affirmative choice not to fund abortions of poor women can fairly be charac-
terized as a decision to enforce the alienation of those women's rights established by Roe).
53. See Comment, supra note 2, at 373 n.82 (by March 1979, 14 of a necessary 34 states
had passed resolutions calling for a constitutional convention to enact that amendment).
54. See Comment, Abortion and Privacy: A Woman's Right to Self Determination, 10
Svi. U.L. Rv. 173, 177 n.24 (1978) (listing Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Pennsylvania and Utah statutes enacted after Roe, which restrict abortion rights by
requiring "consent" requirements, stiff penalties for violation of inconsequential provisions,
complex procedural requirements and other obstacles).
55. K. LurKER, supra note 6, at 216. In the 1980 Gallup poll, 530 of the Americans
surveyed supported abortion in a broad range of circumstances. Id. at 217. See generally id.
at 217-245 (stating that this recent success of the pro-life movement can be explained by both
political and pragmatic reasons, and speculating about the future of the abortion debate).
56. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
57. Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 & n.1 (the Court, in its 6-3 opinion, emphasized that Roe
was carefully considered during its hearings in both the 1971 and 1972 Supreme Court terms).
Since Roe, the Court has continued to accept and adopt principles allowing women the right
to choose whether or not to have an abortion. Id.
58. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
59. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747 (invalidating a parental notification statute).
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writing for the majority, wrote that the Court must uphold the
decision "even when its content gives rise to bitter dispute.'"'6
Changes in the membership of the Supreme Court, however, may
portend a more precarious position for Roe. Justice Stewart, who
concurred in the 7-2 decision in Roe was replaced by Justice O'Con-
nor, who dissented on the merits in Akron.," Former Chief Justice
Burger concurred in Roe, but eventually left the majority in Thorn-
burgh.62 Justice Scalia is expected to rule against implied fundamental
rights like the right to choose an abortion. 3 The replacement of
Justice Powell, who joined the majority in Roe, by Justice Kennedy
could therefore decisively shift the Court's stance on reproductive
rights.64
III. TnE FEDERAL CoNsanroNAL IssUES
The constitutionality of California's parental consent abortion
statute depends on the strength and scope of each of three competing
constitutional interests: (1) The right to sexual privacy;65 (2) a state's
interests and powers to regulate the health and safety of minors; 66
and (3) parents' rights to bring up their children without unwarranted
state interference. 67 Yet although the United States Supreme Court
has developed extensive case law regarding each interest, 68 it has not
successfully cemented them together in a majority opinion to create
a model by which parental consent abortion statutes may be consti-
tutionally measured. 69 This section will first address the Court's
analysis of each of these three competing interests7o and then discuss
the approaches the Court's members have taken or proposed in
judging parental consent statutes. 71 Finally, this section will apply
60. Id. at 771.
61. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J. concurring).
62. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782 (Burger, J., dissenting).
63. L. TRmE, AmEcAN CoNsTrruTioNAL LAW, 1347 n.69 (1988).
64. Justice Powell delivered the Court's opinion in Akron, and joined the majority in
Thornburgh. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 419, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.
65. See infra notes 73-113 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 146-83 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 73-145 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 146-87 and accompanying text.
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section 25958's provisions to the most probable federal constitutional
tests by which it may be judged.72
A. The Right To Sexual Privacy
Despite the lack of an explicit right of privacy in the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court has nonetheless developed two main
areas of constitutional privacy protection. 73 The oldest area of privacy
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment.74 The other major area of privacy rights, with which this
comment primarily focuses, consists of protection against government
regulation of intimate personal activities.75 A line of cases has estab-
lished a right of women to make reproductive health decisions
unfettered by government interference.76 That right is based on the
notion of constitutional "zones of privacy."
'77
As early as 1886, in Boyd v. United States,71 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that "constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed,"
despite the absence of an enumerated right of privacy. 79 In 1890,
Samuel Warren and Justice Brandeis first advocated the protection
of the "inviolate personality" of each person. 0 Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Olmstead v. United States,81 articulated this right of
72. See infra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
73. See Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the
Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 387-402 (1982) (describing the
development of the two areas in federal jurisprudence and the need for a unified approach to
all privacy issues). See also Comment, Privacy: the New Constitutional Language and the Old
Right, 64 CAin. L. Rlv. 347, 353 (1976) (discussing the Supreme Court's approach to privacy
rights under the federal Constitution).
74. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. See e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (protecting
a telephone communication made from the privacy of an enclosed public phone booth).
75. See Paris Adult Theater 1 v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973) (this right of privacy
"is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship").
76. See infra notes 78-107 and accompanying text.
77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (the marital relationship lies "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees").
78. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
79. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616 (applying the fourth and fifth amendments to hold unconsti-
tutional the Customs Law of 1874 which authorized federal courts to require specified
defendants to produce private books, invoices and papers).
80. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy; 4 HIv. L. Rv. 193, 205 (1890) (by
arguing for tort and injunctive relief to those injured by defamation).
81. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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privacy.8 2 He stated that the Constitution confers "as against the
government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." '83
Procreative choice privacy rights of a married couple were first
established in Griswold v. Connecticut 4 That Court held that that
conduct could be regulated by a state only when necessary to protect
a compelling state interest.85 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
recognized roots of this fundamental right in theories of the "pe-
numbras" and "emanations" of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 86
82. Olmstead, at 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (urging that the founders of the
Constitution sought to protect the beliefs, thoughts, emotions and sensations of Americans).
83. Id. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Justice
Harlan articulated, for the first time, the substantive right of privacy from governmental
intrusions). See also Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968) (physical privacy is as
necessary to "relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust" as
"oxygen is for combustion").
84. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Comment, supra note 54, at 175-176 (noting that
commentators are divided on the legitimacy of the Court's discovery of privacy rights in the
Constitution). Some commentators argue that discredited substantive due process policies were
revived by the Court's holdings of privacy rights. See e.g., id. at 175 n.18, (citing Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing the
use of "substantive" due process theory to reach the results of the "privacy" cases)); Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (disapproving
of the premises of the Griswold decision); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1410, 1421-22 (1974) (that the Constitution explicitly protects some privacy rights, like
the right to contract, but not others suggests that the broad privacy rights found by the Court
had been purposely excluded; nonetheless constitutional modernization by the judiciary has
been accepted); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. Rv. 235, 252-53 (1965) (the Court was engaging
in substantive due process in Griswold but dignified and justified its decision by basing it on
the emanations-and-penumbra theory); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections
On (And Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. Ray. 417, 469 (1976) (modern courts should
follow the Griswold Court's example and "breathe into our corpus juris the values which we,
as a society share (whether or not we shared those values yesterday)"). Other commentators
find privacy guarantees within the penumbras of the Constitution. See, e.g., Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-67
(1980) (the Constitution openly makes substantive-based commitments to the privacy rights of
Americans). See also, e.g., Richards, Interpretation and Histiography, 58 S. CAL. L. Rv.
490, 543-45 (1985) (the vitality of the Constitution is ensured when the Court carries out its
duty to articulate changes in the scope of basic human liberties in light of the experiences of
each generation).
85. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (holding unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives to all persons).
86. Id. at 484 (these penumbras are formed by emanations from the guarantees of the
first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments). The Court has found privacy rights rooted
in various constitutional provisions. See e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)
(the fourth and fifth amendments protect against governmental invasions "of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(fourteenth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (the fourth amendment
creates a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (first amendment); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (elaborating the "blessings of
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Justice Goldberg, concurring, noted a privacy right woven in the
"entire fabric of the Constitution,' '87 and Justice Harlan argued that
its foundation lay in the "concept of ordered liberty" guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. s8
Griswold emphasized that the government has heightened expec-
tations of marital privacy by fostering the institution of marriage
and protecting it from interference.89 Despite the significance placed
on the sexual relationship of a married couple in Griswold, the Court
broadened the privacy right to include the reproductive autonomy of
unmarried persons by striking down a Massachusetts statute regulat-
ing the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.10 In that decision, the Court conceded that a state may regulate
problems associated with premarital sex, but found no rational or
legitimate way that the statute distinguished sexual relations between
married or unmarried persons. 91 Although the Eisenstadt Court did
not explicitly rely on a fundamental rights analysis, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, described the privacy right as "the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
'9 2
liberty" guaranteed in the Preamble of the Constitution). For views on the liberty interests
provided by the ninth amendment, see also Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223 (1983) (the ninth amendment did not transform implied
rights into constitutional rights); Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of
Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wvis. L. REv. 1305, 1309, 1344 (the ninth amendment provides a
right of "self-governance").
87. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (1965) (arguing that marital privacy must be a fundamental
right because of clear historic values in freedom of choice in marital relationships).
88. Id. at 500 (the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause is a continuum that
"includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints").
Congress eventually enacted a statutory right of privacy of records and information for all
citizens in 1974. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 stat. 1896 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (1974) ("The Congress finds that ... the right of privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States"). But see
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" . . . law is essential
to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the
source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source").
89. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 ("[the marital relationship is one] lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees").
90. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
91. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448-49.
92. Id. at 453. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 296 (1973) (Eisenstadt implies a new rationale
for the privacy right found in Griswold). See also Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy
by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. Ray. 173, 198 (Eisenstadt "unmasks Griswold as based
on the idea of sexual liberty rather than privacy").
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Five years after Eisenstadt, the Court emphasized in Carey v.
Population Services International,93 that the constitutional privacy
right protects an individual's "right of decision" regarding procrea-
tion.9 4 The Carey Court held unconstitutional a New York statute
allowing only licensed pharmacists to distribute contraceptives. 95 The
Court majority agreed that because the statute would "render con-
traceptive devices considerably less accessible to the public ' 9 6 and
thereby infringe on the constitutional privacy right, only a compelling
state interest could overcome an adult's personal decisions regarding
contraception. 97 The Court held that the restriction at issue failed to
advance the compelling interests asserted by the state and thus
invalidated the statute. 98 The right of privacy has also been recognized
in procreation and child rearing decisions. 100
The Roe Court, building on the foundation of procreational choice
privacy rights laid by Griswold and Eisenstadt, brought abortion
within this privacy protection. 10 In its decision, the Court held that
the Texas statute that prohibited all abortions except when necessary
to save the life of a mother improperly infringed on a woman's right
of privacy.0 2The Court emphasized the degree of detriment suffered
93. 431 U.S. 678 (1978).
94. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 689.
97. Id. at 688 (the constitutional test set forth in Roe "must be applied to state regulations
that burden an individual's right to decide to prevent contraception or pregnancy" by
contraception).
98. Id. at 690 (the interests asserted were those "in maintaining medical standards and in
protecting potential life" and in protecting the health of citizens from all, including nonha-
zardous, contraceptives).
99. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding unconstitutional under
Equal Protection guarantees, an Oklahoma statute mandating the sterilization of specified
recidivists convicted of crimes "amounting to felonies of moral turpitude"). See generally
Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilization and the Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives,
60 N.C.L. Rnv. 943 (1982) (examining the justifications asserted by states for sterilizing the
retarded in light of the fundamental constitutional right to procreate).
100. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the fundamental right of
privacy includes the right to obtain a private education for one's children).
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right of privacy "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"). But see Grey,
Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rv. 703 (1975) (analyzing the "strand
of criticism" centering around this "fundamental interest" branch of the Supreme Court's
decisions); Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FoRDHAM L.
Ray. 807 (1973) (the Court, in Roe, ignored the "personhood" of all fetuses); Heymann &
Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. Rv. 765, 775
(1973) (the constitutional question in Roe was more difficult than that involved in Griswold
and Eisenstadt "only because the asserted state interest is more important, not because of any
difference in the individual interests [in privacy] involved").
102. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
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by a woman who is denied a free choice by a state to abort her
pregnancy.103 Roe does not, however, hold that a woman has an
absolute, unlimited right to obtain an abortion at any time.'0' Rather,
it held that a woman has a fundamental right to choose whether to
have an abortion during her first trimester of pregnancy. 05
Because the limited right to choose an abortion is "fundamental,"
a "strict scrutiny" test must be applied to statutes impairing women's
rights to choose abortions.'01 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a state
may justify a regulation of abortion only if it can show a "compelling
state interest, and that legislative enactments [have been] narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."'
0 7
The Court's decisions concerning abortion rights of minors have,
however, allowed states to show less than compelling interests. For
example, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,0
the Court allowed the state of Missouri to justify its regulation of
minors' abortion rights by merely showing "any significant" interest
103. Id. at 153. Compare Karst, Book Review, 89 HAgv. L. Rnv. 1028, 1036-37 (1976)
(the Court's decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt and Roe all address the roles women are to play
in our society-it "is simply inconceivable that the majority Justices in [Roe] were indifferent"
to this issue and to the fact that the decision liberated women to exercise a fundamental right
to make procreative choices outside of the marriage relationship) with MAcKiNNoN, Roe v.
Wade: A STuDY IN MALE IDEOLOGY IN ABORTION: MORAL AND LEoAL PERSPECTIVEs, 45, 49,
51 (1985) ("[Roe] does not free women, it frees male sexual aggression ... the availability of
abortion [removes] the one remaining reason that women have had for refusing sex besides
the headache").
104. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (" ... it is reasonable and appropriate for a state to decide
that at some point ... the woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she
possesses must be measured accordingly").
105. Id. at 155-56 ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' .
In the recent abortion cases ... courts have recognized [that principle]).
106. Id. at 155. See id. at 164-65. The Court found that a state has: (1) no compelling
interest during the woman's first trimester of pregnancy; (2) an interest in the health of the
pregnant woman during her second trimester of pregnancy that justifies regulation "reasonably
related to maternal health"; and (3) a compelling interest during the woman's third trimester
that allows the state to regulate and prohibit abortions except to preserve the life and health
of the woman for women in that term of pregnancy. Id. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) (Roe's companion case, that clarified and limited the scope of acceptable regulations
that ensure the safety of the operation).
107. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. See id. at 164-65. The Court found that a state has the
following: (1) no compelling interest during the woman's first trimester of pregnancy; (2) an
interest in the health of the pregnant woman during her second trimester of pregnancy that
justifies regulation "reasonably related to maternal health"; and (3) a compelling interest
during the woman's third trimester that allows the state to regulate and prohibit abortions
except to preserve the life and health of the woman for women in that term of pregnancy.
Id. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-86, 690-91 (the state bears the burden of proving that any
encroachment of sexual privacy rights is necessary to fulfill a competing state interest).
108. 426 U.S. 52 (1976).
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of the state.1 9 In so holding, the Court reiterated the significant state
interest standard enunciated in H.L. v. Matheson.110 Additionally, in
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II),11 the Court stated that states are
constitutionally required to "act with particular sensitivity" when
enacting parental consent abortion statutes.1 2 Taken together, these
standards are a "less rigorous" gauge by which to measure section
25958.113
B. The State And Parental Rights Over Minors
1. State Interests And Powers
In enacting section 25958, the California Legislature asserted an
interest in the health and safety of minors to justify its exercise of
legislative power. 1 4 Although minors do have constitutional rights of
privacy,115 the extent of these rights is balanced against state interests
of protecting minors against unwanted pregnancies'1 6 and minors'
109. Danforth, 426 U.S. at 74.
110. 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) ("the statute serves a significant state interest by providing
an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a physician").
111. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
112. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642.
113. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 693 & n.15.
114. 1987 Cal. stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at ("The Legislature finds ... [that] the
medical, emotional and psychological consequences of an abortion are serious ... particularly
when the patient is an immature minor ... Minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences of their
actions").
115. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 678. "The right to privacy in connection with decisions
affecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults." Id. at 693. See also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) ("A child, merely on account of [her] minority, is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution"); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone"); In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 403, 595 P.2d 105, 110, 155
Cal. Rptr. 671, 676 (1979) (upholding a minor's right of privacy "even when the right imposes
a burden on parents or limits parental control") cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
116. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal., Services to Minors Perspective 1 (May 30,
1986) (teenage pregnancy, abortion and childbearing rates in the United States are the highest
in the developed world). Planned Parenthood lists pregnancy as the primary cause of the high
school drop-out rate of girls: 50% of all teen mothers do not finish high school. Id. See San
Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1988, at 14, col. I (according to the A.C.L.U., California has
the second-highest pregnancy rate in the nation for minors of 15-19 years). The State of
California Department of Health Services, in its official 1985 birth records, recorded 18,397
live births by California mothers of ages seventeen and under. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at
635-40 (a state may limit a minor's right to make decisions involving potentially serious
consequences because minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment to make
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own improvident decisions to abort their pregnancies, and preserving
the integrity of the family. 117
The authority of a state to protect, even by encroaching on
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, the health and safety of minors
is broader than that over adults.1 8 The United States Supreme Court,
in New York v. Ferber,119 stated that "it is evident beyond the need
for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling'. ' ' 120 Certain
decisions, including decisions to purchase firearms, cigarettes, alcohol
and certain literature, and to enter certain contracts, are considered
by states to be outside the scope of minors' abilities to act in the
their own or the public's best interest.121
State interests in the health and safety of minors are exercised in
the police power'2 and the power as parens patriae 1 3 for a state to
act in a minor's best interest.124 This authority has generally been
informed decisions considering all of these consequences). The Supreme Court abstained frominterpreting the ambiguous language of the Massachusetts statute in the original hearing ofBellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). The Court then addressed the issue, after the Massa-chusetts Supreme Court interpreted the statute, in Bellotti II. See generally Bellotti 11, 443
U.S. at 625-33 (describing the history of the Bellotti litigation); Note, Wherefore Art ThouDanforth: Bellotti v. Baird, 7 PEPPERDm L. Ray. 965, 975 n.73 (1980) (describing the history
of the BeIlotti litigation and emphasizing the Court's plurality split on the parental consentissue). See generally Comment, supra note 54, at 183-92 (discussion of the relevancy of age
to the right of privacy, and of parental and state rights over minors).
117. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 638 (because of the special role that parents play inbringing up their children, the state has a special interest in encouraging an unmarried pregnant
minor to consult her parents in making her decision whether to have an abortion.)
118. See e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (upholding the application
of a law prohibiting the sales of merchandise by minors to a minor distributing religious
literature).
119. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
120. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (unanimously upholding a conviction for the violation of a statuteprohibiting the production or distribution of material depicting a "sexual performance" by a
child under the age of 16)). See F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (consideringthe special need to protect children from "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking" broadcasts
as a rationale for upholding a Federal Communications Commission action against a radio
station).
121. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976). See also Bykofsky v.Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1256-1257 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (the governmental
interests furthered by a curfew ordinance override the "interest of minors in being abroad
during the nighttime hours") aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976).
122. See Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722, 728, 143 S.E. 530, 536 (1928) ("That inherent
and plenary power in the state over persons and property which enables the people to prohibit
all things inimicable to comfort, safety, health and welfare of society").123. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966) ("The phrase was taken from chancery practice,
where, however, it was used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the
purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child").
124. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967) (criticizing the doctrine of parens
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asserted when the health and safety of a minor is at risk.'2 An
abortion, although a statistically safer procedure than childbearing,
involves physical and psychological dangers along with moral and
emotional implications. 26 A minor may be especially unable to cope
with the implications of an abortion because of her psychological
and physical immaturity.127 Thus states, by enacting parental consent
abortion statutes under their parens patriae powers, subordinate the
privacy interest of a minor to a state's interest in her welfare during
the entire course of the minor's pregnancy.
A state's use of its police power to regulate the sexual conduct of
minors must be legitimate and not arbitrary.'2 The California Leg-
islature ostensibly enacted section 25958 to further the welfare of
pregnant minors by forcing them to discuss their abortion decisions
with their parents.'29 This rationale, however, was criticized in Dan-
patriae asserted by the State of Arizona in committing a 15 year-old, against his father's
wishes, to the state Industrial School); Note, supra note 116, at 975 n.73, (citing Custer, The
Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978) (discussing the development
of the doctrine of parens patriae); Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State
Action After Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1216, 1221 (1977) ("The common law's
presumption that children, like madmen, sailors, and women, lacked sufficient capacity to
understand and consent to the consequences of certain actions effectively narrowed the rights
of minors").
125. Note, supra note 124, at 1222-23 (states have generally denied constitutional rights or
confronted minors with capacity requirements where a minor's activities, including abortions,
have traditionally been "viewed as posing serious consequences for the minor").
126. See A.C.L.U., REPRODUCTvE FREEDOM PROJECT, PARENTAL Norice LAws; TBna'
CATASTROPHIC IMPACT ON TEENAGERS' RiGr TO ABORiON 4 (1986) (abortion is one of the
safest surgical procedures performed). Until after eight weeks of gestation, the risk for all
women of death or major health complications from an abortion is about twenty times lower
than that of childbirth. Id. The disparity in these rates for teenagers alone is even greater. Id.
See also id. at 14-15. "Dr. Willard Cates, former head of the Abortion Surveillance Branch
of the United States Centers for Disease Control ... has concluded that 'delay [in receiving
an abortion] has the largest single effect on the risk to teenagers for complications and death
from abortion'." Id. Further, parental consent or notification requirements delay even those
minors who choose to notify their parents rather than go to court because of the duty of
physicians to document minors' compliance. Id.
127. See Beliotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, noted a minor's "inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner"); 1987 Cal. stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at - (the immediate and long-range consequences
of an abortion may entail serious medical, emotional and psychological consequences for an
immature minor).
128. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state").
129. See 1987 Cal. stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at - (enumerating legislative findings regarding
the need for minors to discuss with their parents the consequences of an abortion). C.f. San
Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 12, 1987, at 6-7 (interview with Barbara Alby, executive director of
the pro-life Women's Lobby). Ms. Alby stated that "youngsters soon will be sitting down just
like they used to and saying 'Mom, Dad, I'm in trouble and I need your help' . . . something
good happens when parents [from good, broken and even problem homes] are involved." Id.
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forth when the Court disagreed with the Missouri Legislature's as-
sertion that parental control of their children's abortions would
further the children's welfare by strengthening their families. 130
2. The Right To The Integrity Of The Family
States, when exercising their police powers and powers as parens
patriae, must be careful not to tread on parents' rights to raise their
children as they wish. By providing for a judicial bypass procedure
to allow "mature" minors to circumvent the statute's parental con-
sent requirements, section 25958 interferes with these parental inter-
ests.' 3 ' The constitutional right and responsibility of parents to raise
and guide their children as they see fit may prevail over "unwarranted
or unreasonable interference" from a state. 132 Furthermore, the Four-
teenth Amendment ensures the right "to marry, establish a home
and bring up children .... 133 Historically, parents could assert
authority over their children in all areas of the child's life unless the
state could overcome that right with another strong public policy. 34
This right of parents extended until the child reached the age of
majority or became emancipated in one of various ways.135
130. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). See generally Note, In
re Scott K.: The Juvenile's Right to Privacy in the Home, 68 CAne. L. Ray. 783, 790 (1980)
(discussing the Danforth Court's view of the consequences of forcing communication between
a parent and a pregnant daughter); Dembitz, The Supreme Court and a Minor's Abortion
Decision, 80 CoLuM. L. Ra,. 1251 (1980) (parental consent abortion laws rarely relate to and
are often contrary to a minor's well-being).
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b)-(d) (West Supp. 19.89).
132. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73 (1976). See Comment, Parent,
Child, and the Decision to Abort: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Statutory Proposal in
Bellotti v. Baird, 52 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1869, 1871 (1979) ("Because state intervention on behalf
of the child may also carry the potential threat of state exploitation of the child, and because
such a threat is particularly inimical to a pluralistic society when value-oriented interests are
involved, the moral guidance and preparation of the child for the 'additional obligations' of
life has been the duty of the parent, not the state"). See generally Newton v. Burgin, 363 F.
Supp. 782, 785-86 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (discussion of the constitutional status of these rights of
parents) aff'd, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). See also generally Comment, Confidential Communication
Between Parent and Child: A Constitutional Right, 16 SAN DiErao L. Rsv. 811 (1979) (discussing
the Constitutional protection preventing a state from compelling a parent to disclose an
unemancipated son or daughter's confidences).
133. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
134. See Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAm. L.Q. 393, 396 (1970)
("The line between neglect and the right of parents to rear their children must be drawn
against the state's interest in the rights the children have in being provided with substantial
opportunity and a chance for a successful life").
135. Id. at 395 ("either voluntarily or by operation of the law, i.e., by marriage or by
entry into the armed services").
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The Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska, held unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting136 families from educating their young children in specified
foreign languages. 3 7 It based its decision on the belief that "the
liberty of the family unit may not be interfered with.., by legislative
action which ... [has no] reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the state to effect.' ' 38 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,
39
the Court stated that a family's right against interference from the
state is a basic civil right of man and is fundamental to the survival
of the human race. 40
Parents' rights, however, are not absolute.' 41 In Runyan v. Mc-
Crary, 42 the Court upheld a Congressional Act desegregating, over
the protests of parents, racially discriminatory private schools.1 43 In
Baker v. Owen,' 44 the Court similarly held that parental authorization
136. Id. at 397 (the prohibition applied until a child "attained and successfully passed the
eighth grade").
137. Id. at 403.
138. Id. at 400. See Santoski v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (the Court recognized a
fundamental right in the parent-child relationship when it held that states must provide
procedural safeguards against improperly removing children from their parents); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that a statute defining obscenity in terms of an
appeal of the prurient interest of minors was constitutional). "The parents' claim to authority
in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society." Id. at 639; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (an unwed father has a
constitutional right to custody of his illegitimate children when their mother dies). Compare
id. with Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (denying an unmarried father the right
to veto the adoption of his children when the father had "never exercised actual or legal
custody and thus [had] never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child," and the state had determined that
an adoption would be in the child's "best interest"). See also Hafen, The Constitutional Status
of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81
MIcH. L. Rav. 463, 559, (1983) (when the law protects family relationships, it helps "sustain
long-term individual liberty").
139. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
140. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (1942). See Santoski v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (states
must provide procedural safeguards against improperly removing children from their parents).
See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (an unwed father has a constitutional right
to custody of his illegitimate children when their mother dies). Compare id. with Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (denying an unmarried father the constitutional right to
veto the adoption of his children when the father had "never exercised actual or legal custody
and thus [had] never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child," and the state had determined that
an adoption would be in the child's "best interest").
141. See Note, supra note 116, at 976 (examples include compulsory schooling, rehabilitation
of juvenile delinquents and mandatory vaccination programs).
142. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
143. Runyan, 427 U.S. at 179 (upholding a congressional act to prohibit segregated
academies by utilizing the thirteenth, along with the first, amendment). But see Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (the Court will rehear arguments to determine
"[w]hether or not [the decision of] Runyan v. McCrary ... should be reconsidered?").
144. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
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for the corporeal punishment of their children in school is not
constitutionally required.145 Thus an analysis of statutes allowing state
protection of minors who are unable or unwilling to seek the consent
of their parents to obtain abortions requires a different constitutional
balance than that of statutes pitting only the interests of the state
and family against each other. When analyzing the parental consent
issue, the constitutional interests of minors seeking aid from the state
to escape the denial of abortion rights by parents must also be
considered.
C. Supreme Court Guidelines For Parental Consent Statutes
The Supreme Court has grappled with parental consent statutes
similar to section 25958 and has tried to balance conflicting consti-
tutional interests of pregnant minors, states and families. Unfortu-
nately, the Court has not defined in a majority opinion the degree
of state or parental control that may be exerted over a minor's
abortion decisions. Members of the Court have, however, forwarded
constitutional standards, all of which uphold parental consent re-
quirements within specified constraints."4'
The United States Supreme Court first addressed a "parental
consent" abortion law in Danforth 47 The Missouri statute in ques-
tion required an unmarried woman under age eighteen to obtain the
consent of a parent, 148 regardless of the stage of her pregnancy, in
order to obtain an abortion. 49 The Court invalidated the requirement
by holding that states may not impose a "blanket" parental veto
power. 50 Justice Blackmun, the opinion's author, explained that
"blanket" requirements of parental consent are unconstitutional be-
cause "any independent interest the parents [might] have in the
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy [is] no more weighty
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to
145. Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 303.
146. L. TRINE, AmERICAN CoNsTTooNAL LAW, 1344 (2d ed. 1988).
147. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
148. See id. at 58 (or person in loco parentis).
149. Id. ("unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order
to preserve the life of the mother"). A physician violating the parental consent provision
would be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor offense. Id. at 59.
150. Id. at 74 ("the state does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party
an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to
terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent").
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have become pregnant."'' The Court tested the statute's constitu-
tionality by asking "whether there is any significant state interest in
conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent... that is not
present in the case of an adult.' '1 52 It then found that a parent's
unconditional abortion veto power would probably not safeguard
family units or parental authority, as the state had asserted. 5 3 The
Court concluded that the statute must fall because it violated minors'
privacy rights "without a sufficient justification for the restric-
tion."154
The Supreme Court again found a parental consent law unconsti-
tutional and delivered a second standard by which to judge the
constitutionality of parental consent abortion laws in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti I1).155 The challenged Massachusetts statute not only required
a parent's consent, but also allowed a judge, by finding that an
abortion was not in that particular minor's best interest, to override
the wishes of a minor to make an abortion decision. 5 6 No majority
of Justices coalesced to agree on one opinion in Bellotti 11. 57 Justice
Powell reasoned that minors may not always have constitutional
rights equivalent to adults because: (1) children are peculiarly vul-
nerable; (2) they are unable to make critical decisions in an informed
and mature manner; and (3) parents play an important role in child
rearing.- 8
Upon that reasoning, Justice Powell presented new minimum re-
quirements by which the constitutionality of parental consent statutes
151. Id. at 75. See Comment, supra note 54, at 183 (this acknowledgment of a privacy
right for minors "represents a major step in minors' struggle for constitutional protection").
152. Danforth, 428 at 74.
153. Id. (especially where "the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the
family structure").
154. Id.
155. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
156. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (to approve the abortion, a court had to find that the
abortion would be in the best interest of the minor who was well-informed of the implications
of her decision).
157. The Bellotti II Court divided into four camps. Chief Justice Burger, along with
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Powell in proposing a new constitutional standard
by which to measure parental consent abortion statutes. Id. at 624. Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens in concurring with Justice Powell, but this group held
to a narrow interpretation of the Danforth standard. Id. at 652 (Stevens, J. concurring).
Justice White dissented from both positions, arguing that a parent has an unqualified right of
notification of the parent's child's desire to obtain an abortion. Id. at 656 (White, J. dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate concurring opinion, noted that he joined Justice Powell's
decision only until Danforth could be reevaluated, and only to provide some guidance to lower
court judges. Id. at 651 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 634.
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could be judged. 5 9 He concluded that the abortion rights of minors
can be restricted so that pregnant minors must obtain consent for
their abortions by one or both parents' 60 or obtain authorization by
petitioning a court or nonjudicial hearing agency. 16' The court or
agency may be required to determine the "maturity '1 62 or "best
interest" of a minor before approving the petition. 63 This alternate
route of authorization must be prompt and confidential to ensure
that a minor who has been granted authorization still has time to
obtain the abortion. 164 Accordingly, a court or agency that failed to
find that a pregnant minor who did not obtain parental consent was
sufficiently mature or that an abortion would not be in her best
interest could thereby deny the minor access to a legal abortion. 16
Justice Powell's Bellotti II standard for allowing pregnant minors to
show that they are mature and well-informed enough to make their
abortion decisions was criticized by Justice Stevens for failing to
guide a judge in determining a minor's maturity or best interests. 66
He argued that the standard "provides little real guidance to the
judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal
values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor ... is funda-
mentally at odds with the privacy interests underlying the constitu-
tional protection afforded to her decision.''167
Despite Justice Stevens' criticism, the Court majority followed the
reasoning of Justice Powell's Bellotti 11 plurality opinion along with
that of Danforth in upholding a Utah parental notification statute
in H.L. v. Matheson.168 In Matheson, a fifteen year old girl sought
to obtain an abortion without notifying her parents, with whom she
159. Id. at 643-44.
160. Id. at 649 (the plurality would allow a state to require the consent of both parents
when both parents are living together with a minor, so that procuring parental consent would
not unduly delay the statutory procedure). That plurality, however, noted that the mutual
decision of a minor and only one of her parents "should be given great, if not dispositive
weight." Id. at 649 n.29.
161. Id. at 643 n.22.
162. Id. at 643.
163. Id. at 647-48.
164. Id. at 644.
165. Id. at 648.
166. Id. at 648.
167. Id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). Chief Justice Burger delivered the Court's opinion, in which
Justices Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Id. at 399. Justice Powell filed a
concurring opinion in which Justice Stewart joined. Id. at 413 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens filed a separate concurring opinion. Id at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring). Finally, Justice
Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined. Id. at
425 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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lived. 16 The physician, however, refused to perform her operation
without notifying the girl's parents, as the Utah law required.170
Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the opinion for the majority,
narrowly analyzed the statute in the situation when a pregnant minor:
(1) "is living with and dependant on her parents;"1 71 (2) was "not
emancipated; ' 172 and (3) had not shown or attempted to show her
maturity or relations with her parents. 73 He cited constitutional
standing rules for excluding analysis of the application of the statute
to mature and emancipated minors and thereby skirted the consti-
tutional issue of the statute's failure to provide for a judicial bypass
procedure.17 4 Thus, when applied to immature and unemancipated
minors, the majority reasoned, the notification requirement does not
burden abortion rights in any constitutionally significant way. 75 The
Court favorably cited Justice Powell's Bellotti II concern with serving
important considerations of family integrity and protecting immature
and dependent minors. 7 6 The Court also reaffirmed the Danforth
test in holding that the statute furthered the significant state interest
of protecting the family relationship by providing parents the op-
portunity to "supply essential medical and other information to a
physician" prior to the abortion.
77
Powell's opinion applied the standard set forth by the plurality
opinion in Bellotti II in deciding City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc.178 and Planned Parenthood Association v.
Ashcroft,179 both of which concerned parental consent statutes. In
Akron, the Court found an Ohio parental consent regulation uncon-
stitutional because it created an irrebuttable presumption that all
minors under the age of fifteen are immature.180 Thus the Court
invalidated the provision for failing to provide a judicial bypass
procedure for minors under fifteen in which they could prove their
maturity or best interests.1 81 Although the Ashcroft Court was unable
169. Id. at 400-01.
170. Id. at 400.
171. Id. at 407.
172. Id. (by marriage or otherwise).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 406-07.
175. Id. at 409 (citing Bellotti fl).
176. Id. at 411.
177. Id. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
178. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
179. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
180. Akron, 462 U.S. at 440.
181. Id.
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to join in a majority opinion, the Court found the Missouri parental
consent provision constitutional because it met the Bellotti II plur-
ality's standards.'12 The statute analyzed in Ashcroft provided for
confidential and expeditious judicial authorization procedures and
therefore met constitutional standards.'83
In light of its use of Justice Powell's Bellotti II principles in its
reasoning in Matheson, Akron and Ashcroft, the Court is likely to
continue to analyze parental consent abortion statutes like section
25958 by applying Justice Powell's Bellotti 11 model.'84 That model,
as explained by Justice Powell, necessarily incorporates Danforth's
ban against "blanket" parental veto powers.'85 Although Justice
Powell's Bellotti H opinion mentioned the importance of merely
"important" state interests,' 86 the Matheson Court's reaffirmance of
Danforth's "significant state interests" test may reestablish that
standard as one which parental consent abortion statutes must meet
to survive constitutional scrutiny.' 87
Section 25958's parental consent and judicial bypass provisions
must meet these standards in order to pass constitutional muster.
Section 25958 provides an alternate judicial bypass route by which a
minor may circumvent the parental consent requirement.'88 This
judicial bypass provision allows a court to determine a minor's
maturity or best interests in deciding whether or not to approve her
petition for an abortion.'8 9 The statute also requires an expeditious
consideration by the court of a minor's request. 90 The statute,
182. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 478 (only Justice Burger joined Justice Powell in his opinion
finding the parental consent provision constitutional). Justices O'Connor, White and Rehnquist
voted to uphold the provision, but indicated that they would vote in future decisions to give
greater control over minors to parents. Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens found the provision unconstitutional. Id. at 503-04
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). These Justices argue that minors who decide whether
to seek an abortion should not be subjected to the veto powers of parents or state authorities.
Id.
183. See id. at 479 n.4 (the statute allowed a maximum of 5 days for the judicial review
of the minor's petition). See also Indiana Planned Parenthood v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127,
1134-39 (7th Cir. 1983) (the court applied the constitutional principles set forth in Akron and
Ashcroft to find unconstitutional a statute falling to require the expeditious review of petitions).
184. J. NowAK, R. RoTuNDA AND J. YouNG, CoNsTrrtioNAL LAW 706 (3d ed. 1986)
("For the time being, the principles set forth in Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bellotti
II will prevail, because in those instances when the Powell tests are met, there will be a
majority of justices voting to uphold the parental consent requirement").
185. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
186. Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 648.
187. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
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therefore, should meet the Danforth requirement against blanket
parental veto powers. 191 The California provision was passed, osten-
sibly, to protect the health and safety of pregnant unemancipated
minors.192 Identical state interests were considered sufficient to uphold
a parental consent abortion statute in Justice Powell's Bellotti II
opinion, and in Matheson. 93 Thus, section 25958 meets the consti-
tutional requirements set forth in Justice Powell's Bellotti 11 model;
therefore it should survive scrutiny under the United States Consti-
tution. 94
IV. CALIFoRNIA CONSTITUTIONAL IssUEs
The constitutionality of section 25958 also depends on the history
and breadth of California's right of privacy. 195 The California Con-
stitution explicitly guarantees this right, 96 the Legislature has pro-
vided sexual and other privacy rights of minors, 97 and the California
Supreme Court has protected sexual and other privacy rights in
several cases. 93 The court, however, has not mandated a particular
test by which section 25958 may be measured. 99 This section will
first illuminate the history and breadth of the California right of
privacy. 200 Then this section will review sexual and health care privacy
rights in California. 20" Within this paradigm, this section will review
the California Supreme Court's analysis and legislative provisions of
the right of sexual privacy, 2 2 and suggest a standard by which section
25958 may be tested.
20 3
A. The History and Breadth of the California Right of Privacy
The right of privacy in California, as distinguished from the federal
right, was guaranteed even prior to its express recognition in the
191. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
192. 1987 Cal. stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at-.
193. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411
(1981).
194. Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 644.
195. See infra notes 204-40 and accompanying text.
196. See CAL. CONSr. art. I, § 1.
197. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 25.9-34.10 (West 1982).
198. See infra notes 204-46, 263-84 and accompanying text.
199. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 204-40 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 241-301 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 241-84 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 285-301 and accompanying text.
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state Constitution in psychotherapist-patient communications, 204 per-
sonal financial disclosures, 20 the contents of trash cans, 20 6 and the
freedom of welfare recipients from early morning government raids
to determine welfare eligibility. 2°7 In 1969, four years before Roe,
the California Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right of
procreative choice, when in People v. Belous,20 8 it invalidated a 119-
year old statute prohibiting non life-threatening abortions.2 9
In 1972, California voters passed an amendment to the state
Constitution which explicitly guarantees the right of privacy to all
California citizens. 2 0 The California right has been more broadly
interpreted than the federal right, as noted by the California Supreme
Court, in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson.21 1 In Adamson, the
court refused to rely on the federal cases of Belle Terre v. Boraas22
and Moore v. City of East Clevelan 1 3 in upholding the rights of
unrelated persons to choose to dwell together.2 4 According to Justice
Newman, who wrote the majority opinion, "even if Justice Douglas's
majority opinion in Belle Terre still does declare federal law, the
federal right of privacy in general appears to be narrower than what
the voters approved ... when they added "privacy" to the California
Constitution. ' 21 5 California courts have also consistently led the
204. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
205. See, e.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970).
206. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1969).
207. See, e.g., Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967).
208. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1970). See generally Comment, Roe! Doe! Where are You?: The Effect of the Supreme
Court's Abortion Decisions, 7 U.C. DAvis L. Ray. 432 (1974) (emphasizing the effects of Roe
and Bolton on California law).
209. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 973-74, 458 P.2d at 206, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
210. CAL. CONSr. art. I, § 1. The section provides: "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness and privacy." Id. See generally Gerstein, supra note 73, at 386 (The explicit
constitutional language gives the California right of privacy "a more secure foundation" than
the federal right); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. Rav. 489 (1977) (describing the trend of the states to incorporate privacy rights in
their own state constitutions).
211. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.3, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3 (1980).
212. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
213. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
214. But see In re Cummings, 30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826, (1982)
(upholding a prison regulation defining only those related to a prisoner by blood or law as
"immediate family" to qualify for overnight visitation rights).
215. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3.
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federal courts in recognizing personal privacy rights, and have more
broadly defined these protections.
216
The privacy right in California need not rely on emanations from
other explicit rights or from interpretations of the United States
Supreme Court because the California Supreme Court has held that
"the California Constitution is, and always has been, a document
of independent force. ' 217 The California court, in C.D.R.R. v. Myers,
emphasized that principles of federalism create the responsibility of
state courts to maintain state constitutions as the "first ... line of
protection of the individual against the excesses of local officials. ' 2 18
Accordingly, the court noted that state courts are "independently
responsible" for protecting the separate and unique constitutional
rights of citizens of the individual states. 219 This obligation is partic-
ularly pertinent to Californians because in 1972 voters adopted a
constitutional amendment providing that the "rights guaranteed by
this [California] Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed
by the United States Constitution."'' 20
The California Supreme Court, in interpreting the scope of the
California privacy right, relied on the language of the official voter
pamphlet distributed when the privacy amendment was on the ballot
in White v. Davis.221 The White court stated that "California deci-
sions have long recognized the propriety of resorting to such election
brochure arguments as an aid in construing constitutional amend-
216. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 291-92, 625
P.2d 779, 803-04, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 890 (1981) (Bird, J., concurring). Compare, e.g., Ballard
v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971) (refusing to interpret a
California statute to give parents veto powers over the abortions of their mature minors),
Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (right to choose a marriage partner
regardless of race), In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966) (right
to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one's house) and People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d
263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) (protection from warrantless arrest in one's
home), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976) with Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) and
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
217. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315, 329 (1975).
218. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 261, 625 P.2d at
783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (1981) (quoting People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 550, 531 P.2d
at 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329).
219. Id. (quoting Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d at 551, 531 P.2d at 1114, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 330).
See id. at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (quoting People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d
334, 605 P.2d 401, 161 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1980) (the California Supreme Court stated that it is
to "recognize [its] personal obligation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining
the meaning and application of state constitutional provisions").
220. CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 24.
221. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
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merits .... "22 It also emphasized the broad requirement of gov-
ernmental respect for the privacy of individuals in the pamphlet's
description of the right as: "the right to be left alone. It is a
fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our
families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our person-
alities, our freedom of communication and our freedom to associate
with the people we choose.' ' 3
White was brought by a University of California professor who
sued the Los Angeles police department for allegedly monitoring his
classes and making reports on discussions the police observed. 224 The
reports, which were kept in police files, did not pertain to illegal
activities.2 15 The Supreme Court held that the action constituted a
"prima facie violation of the state constitutional right of privacy.''226
Similarly, in People v. Privitera,2 7 the California court again ex-
amined the voter pamphlet and emphasized that "the moving force
behind the new constitutional provision was a more focused privacy
concern relating to the accelerated encroachment on personal freedom
and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection
activity in contemporary society." 2 The Privitera court found no
evidence of an intention of the California voters to create a specific
"right of access to drugs of unproven efficacy," like laetrile.329
Justice Newman, dissenting in Privitera, disagreed with the major-
ity's approach of "[reading] the amendment as if it were a statutory
prohibition rather than the simple and majestic statement of a
fundamental constitutional right." 230 The California court has since
extended the privacy right, while ignoring the Privitera interpretation
of the right to privacy, in Adamson and Myers.2 3 Adamson, which
protected the privacy of those who choose to dwell together, and
222. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 775 n.11, 533 P.2d at 234 n.11, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.11
(1975).
223. Id. at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (quoting Cal. Ballot Pamphlet of
1972, at 28). See Gerstein, supra note 73, at 405 ("To say that we have a privacy right in this
sense is to say that the integrity of these aspects of our lives demands respect").
224. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 762, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 776, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
227. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1979).
228. Privetera, 23 Cal. 3d at 710, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
229. Id. at 709, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
230. Gerstein, supra note 73, at 404-05.
231. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d
779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d
436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
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Myers, which protected the right of indigent women, to obtain
abortions broadened the California constitutional privacy protection
to protect Californians not only from government "snooping," but
also from intrusive government regulations.
232
The California Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to
contested government actions burdening or impairing the right of
privacy in California in White, People v. Stritzinger23 and Long
Beach City Employees Association v. City of Long Beach.2 34 In
White, the California court directed the trial court to apply the
standard to scrutinize the asserted police interests for monitoring
university classroom discussions, 235 and in Stritzinger the court applied
the standard to determine whether the constitutional privacy interest
in the psychotherapist-patient privilege had been violated by the
state .216 In Long Beach City Employees Association, the court re-
quired the city to show a compelling interest and demonstrate the
necessity of its policy of polygraph-examining a broad category of
city employees. 237 Justice Broussard, writing for the majority, noted
that "there may be a rational relationship between polygraph testing
as a method of investigation," but that the City's justification of
"maintaining the real and apparent integrity of the public service"
was not "compelling." 238 The court noted, without elaborating, the
availability of "less intrusive means to investigate alleged wrongdo-
ing. ' 239 Because the polygraph testing scheme was unnecessarily in-
trusive, the court held it invalid under the California right of privacy.m
B. Rights to Sexual and Health Care Privacy in California
1. Supreme Court Analysis and Legislative Provisions
The California Supreme Court, like its federal counterpart, has
established substantive rights of sexual and health care privacy.
232. Gerstein, supra note 73, at 406.
233. 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983).
234. 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
235. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 772, 533 P.2d 223, 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 104
(1975).
236. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d at 511, 668 P.2d at 742, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
237. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n., 41 Cal. 3d at 948, 719 P.2d at 666, 227 Cal.
Rptr. at 96 (1986).




Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
Belous and Myers establish in California a general right similar to
the federal one "to make sensitive reproductive health care decisions
without the unwarranted intrusion of government."" The broader
California right, furthermore, is explicitly guaranteed by the Cali-
fornia Constitution to "all persons.'A 2 California courts "readily
apply to minors the general concepts of privacy." 2 3 These courts
have held that minors: (1) may bring a tort action for invasion of
privacy;2 4 (2) enjoy a state constitutional privacy right against un-
reasonable searches and seizures;25 and (3) have a similar right as
against school officials' standing in loco parentis.2
The California legislature, too, has protected the privacy of une-
mancipated minors in a series of Civil Code sections that emancipate
minors to consent for their medical care. 4 7 These provisions have
given minors considerable latitude to obtain reproductive and other
types of health care and counseling without parental consent. 2 4  The
statutes additionally provide a personal right to confidentiality of
medical records 4 9 Specifically, the California Civil Code provides
minors of any age the right to independently consent to: (1) "Hos-
pital, medical and surgical care, related to the prevention or treatment
of pregnancy,' '20 which before the enactment of section 25958 in-
cluded abortions,2' and (2) treatment for sexual assault.2 2 Minors
241. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 277, 226
Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (1986).
242. See id. at 278, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 379. See also In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 556,
709 P.2d 1287, 1290, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (1985) ("It is well settled that minor[s] ... are
'persons' under our state ... [Constitution] and therefore possess fundamental rights which
the state must respect").
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Vescovo v. New Way Enters., Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d 582, 587-88, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 89 (1976).
245. See, e.g., In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). See generally Note, supra note 130, at 786 ("The Scott K.
majority appeared to argue that this 'right to privacy' should, by virtue of Carey [v. Population
Servs. Int., 431 U.S. 678 (1977)] and [Planned Parenthood v.] Danforth, [428 U.S. 52 (1976)]
be granted to juveniles whenever it has been granted to adults").
246. In re William G., 40 Cal. 3d at 560-61, 709 P.2d at 1292-93, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 123-
24 (public high school officials without prior knowledge about a student's possession, use or
sale of marijuana have no reasonable basis to search a student's calculator case).
247. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d 245, 269, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 372 (1986) (citing CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 25.9-34.10) (West 1982).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 269, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
250. CAL. Crv. CODE § 34.5 (Vest Supp. 1989).
251. See Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 884, 484 P.2d 1345, 1353, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1,
9 (1971) (interpreting former California Civil Code section 34.5 to allow mature minors to
obtain abortions along with other pregnancy-related health care). See also 1987 Cal. stat. ch.
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of at least twelve years of age are emancipated to consent to treatment
for: (1) Communicable and sexually transmitted diseases;2
3 (2) rape; 254
(3) drug and alcohol abuse;255 and (4) mental health counseling.
256
Minors of fifteen years of age and older are emancipated to consent
to surgical and other specified hospital treatment.27  Civil Code
sections 56.10-56.1625 and Health and Safety Code section 25252219
additionally give California minors the right to the privacy of their
confidential medical records. Although these statutes allow minors
sexual2 ° and other261 privacy rights, the California Supreme Court
has determined that they are not absolute.
262
The California Supreme Court, in Ballard v. Anderson,263 inter-
preted the Civil Code to allow minors to independently obtain
abortions, but limited the right to minors of sufficient maturity to
be able to give an "informed consent" to the procedure .2 4 The court
later held in Myers that although sexual privacy rights generally could
be impaired, the manner of impairment must be the "least offensive
alternative adequate to achieve any legitimate state interest.''265 This
standard "requires the state to 'establish the unavailability of less
offensive alternatives and [to] demonstrate that the conditions are
1237, sec. 2 at- (amending CAL. Crv. CODE § 34.5) (requiring a minor to procure a
parent's consent in order to obtain an abortion).
252. CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.9 (West 1982).
253. Id. § 34.7.
254. Id. § 34.8.
255. Id. § 34.10.
256. Id. § 25.9.
257. Id. § 34.6.
258. Id. §§ 56.10-56.16 (West 1982) (providing that only the minor may consent to disclosure
of the minor's confidential medical records).
259. CAL. HE LTH & SAFETY CODE § 25252 (allowing only the minor and the minor's
health care representative to have access to specified medical records of the minor).
260. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 34.5, 34.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
261. Id. §§ 25.9, 34.6, 34.8, 34.9, 34.10.
262. See Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1,
8 (1971) (limiting abortion rights of minors to those minors of sufficient maturity to give
informed consent to the surgery).
263. 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
264. Ballard, 4 Cal. 3d at 883, 484 P.2d at 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (emphasis in original)
(interpreting California Civil Code section 34.5). See Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de
Kamp, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 271 n.10, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 374 n.10 (the California Court of
Appeals for the First Appellate District considered this precedent and specifically extended the
right to sexual privacy under the state Constitution to at least the mature minor, "who may
very well be under 14"). See also People v. Toliver, 270 Cal. App. 2d 492, 496, 75 Cal. Rptr.
819, 822 (1969) (children under the age of 14 constitute a protected class under the California
statute prohibiting lewd and lascivious conduct with minors under the age of 14) cert. denied,
396 U.S. 895 (1969).
265. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 282, 531 P.2d
779, 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 884 (1981).
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drawn with narrow specificity, restricting the exercise of constitutional
rights only to the extent necessary to maintain the integrity of the
program which confers the benefits' ."266 Thus the presumption in
section 25958, that all minors are too immature to make abortion
decisions unless they demonstrate otherwise, 267 and the requirement
of parental consent to obtain an abortion26 raise two issues under
the right of privacy in the California Constitution: (1) What standard
of judicial scrutiny should be used to measure the constitutionality
of section 25958, and (2) whether any burden on this right of minors
is subject to the "least offensive alternative necessary to achieve the
state's interests" test.
269
The California court has applied three different standards in de-
termining the requisite state interest in its decisions concerning the
California right of sexual privacy. First, in People v. Belous 270 and
Conservatorship of Valerie N.,271 the court applied strict scrutiny to
invalidate the state's prohibition of most abortions. 272 In Valerie N.,
the court found the state to have no compelling interest in denying
access to sterilization for an incompetent thirty year old develop-
mentally disabled adult.
273
In contrast, the court used a rational basis standard to invalidate
a contested interpretation of a statute emancipating minors for preg-
nancy-related medical care in Ballard.274 In that case, Dr. Ballard, a
surgeon at the Los Angeles County-U.S.C. Medical Center, sued the
Center on behalf of his pregnant and unemancipated minor pa-
tients.27 5 Dr. Ballard and his patients disagreed with the Center's
266. Id.
267. CAL. Hn .ui & SAmrY CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1989).
268. Id. § 25958(a).
269. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 282, 531 P.2d at 797, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
270. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
271. 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985).
272. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 963-72, 458 P.2d at 199-205, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-65 ("The
critical issue is . .. whether the state has a compelling interest in the regulation of a subject
which is within the police powers of a state ... whether the regulation is necessary to the
accomplishment of a permissible state policy ... and whether legislation impinging on
constitutionally protected areas is narrowly drawn and not 'unlimited and indiscriminate
sweep."'); Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 164-69, 707 P.2d at 774-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401-05
("... we must determine whether the state has a compelling interest ... and if so, whether
[the legislation] is necessary to accomplish the state purpose. Similarly, in assessing any
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, we must determine whether
the state has a compelling interest ... in regulating the subject, whether the regulation is
necessary to accomplish the purpose, and if the restriction is narrowly drawn").
273. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 164-69, 707 P.2d at 774-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401-05.
274. Ballard v. Anderson. 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8.
275. Id. at 876-78, 484 P.2d at 1346-48, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 2-4.
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Therapeutic Abortion Committee's assertion that former California
Civil Code section 34.5, allowing a minor of any age to obtain
confidential pregnancy-related surgical care, should be interpreted to
require parental consent for a minor's abortion. 276 The court agreed
with Ballard, holding that there is no rational basis for requiring all
minors, regardless of their maturity, to obtain parental consent. 277
A third standard of review of governmental infringements of sexual
privacy was used by the court in Myers. The Myers court used a
tripartite test which was established in Bagley v. Washington Town-
ship Hospital District.278 This test has been applied to statutory
schemes "that condition the receipt of [governmental] benefits upon
a recipient's waiver of a constitutional right or upon his exercise of
such right in a manner which the government approves." 279 Under
this test, the state must do the following: (1) "Establish that the
imposed conditions relate to the purposes of the legislation which
confers the benefit or privilege;' '2 ° (2) show that "the utility of
imposing the conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting im-
pairment of constitutional rights;"2'' and (3) "establish the unavail-
ability of less offensive alternatives and demonstrate that the conditions
are drawn with narrow specificity . .. to maintain the integrity of
the program which confers the benefits. ' 28 2 In Bagley, the court
applied a statute prohibiting specified public employees from cam-
paigning for the recall of their supervisors to this test.28 3 The court
276. Id. at 877, 484 P.2d at 134647, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
277. Id. at 883, 484 P.2d at 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
278. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 265, 625
P.2d 779, 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873 (1981); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist.,
65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) (finding unconstitutional restraints
imposed upon the political activities of public employees).
279. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (1981). See, e.g.,
Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964) (finding
broadly worded restrictions on the political activities of public employees unconstitutional);
Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 434 P.2d 961, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1967)
(persons can not be barred from public employment for associating in a manner protected by
the first amendment); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1967) (holding unconstitutional the government practice of conditioning the receipt
of welfare benefits upon a recipient's waiver of his constitutional right of privacy in his home);
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430
(1967) (striking down public transit agency's policy that allowed advertising space on public
buses for commercial expression but not for political commentary); Finot v. Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (action by a board of education
and a school district of assigning a teacher to a less-desirable assignment because he wore a
beard in violation of school policy was held unconstitutional).
280. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 505-06, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
281. Id. at 506, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
282. Id. at 507, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
283. Id. at 507-11, 421 P.2d at 415-18, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407-10.
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invalidated the enactment when the state failed to sufficiently justify
its prohibition.24
2. A Standard for Measuring Section 25958 under the
California Constitution
In determining the proper standard of review for section 25958,
this statute should be compared to the enactments analyzed in Belous
and Valerie N., Ballard and C.D.R.R. v. Myers.285 Because section
25958 does not deny all abortion rights to minors, the strict scrutiny
standard of Belous and Valerie N. should not apply. Belous addressed
a near blanket prohibition of all abortions;28 6 Valerie N. concerned
a denial of all sterilization rights to incompetent Californians. 217 In
contrast, the rational basis standard used in Ballard may not provide
a strict enough gauge by which to measure section 25958.28 Although
the Ballard court asked merely whether a rational basis existed for
infringing the abortion rights of minors, the court specifically did
not analyze whether the statute itself could stand. Rather the court
discussed whether abortions could rationally be distinguished from
other "pregnancy-related surgical care."''8 9 This ultimate question
suggests that Ballard was decided on equal protection overbreadth
grounds as well as on concerns regarding the privacy rights of minors.
The tripartite Bagley test used in Myers appears to be the most
appropriate for assessing the constitutionality of section 25958 under
the California Constitution. 0 The test is applicable to statutes like
section 25958 that "condition ... [the] exercise of [a constitutional]
right in a manner which the government approves.'- 291 Using this
test, the first question is whether section 25958's conditions relate to
the legislation's purposes. 29 Because the legislation's stated purpose
284. Id.
285. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969); Conser-
vatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d 143, 707 P.2d 760, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1985); Ballard v.
Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
286. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 963-72, 458 P.2d at 199-205, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-65.
287. Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d at 164-69, 707 P.2d at 774-78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 401-05.
288. See Ballard, 4 Cal. 3d at 883, 484 P.2d at 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
289. Id. at 883, 484 P.2d at 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
290. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
291. Id. at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
292. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505-06, 421 P.2d 409,
414, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (1966).
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is to further the welfare of pregnant unemancipated minors293 and
section 25958's conditions ostensibly relate to that purpose, this
statute should meet the test's first part. The second question under
the test is whether the utility of imposing section 25958's conditions
manifestly outweigh resulting impairments of minors' rights. 29 4 Be-
cause all minors, according to Ballard, do not have absolute rights
to sexual privacy, 295 a court would probably defer to the Legislature's
determination that the requirements of section 25958 are necessary
to further their welfare. 296
Finally, the third question under the Bagley-Myers test is whether
section 25958 must be the least offensive alternative necessary to
facilitate the state's interests in the welfare of minors.2 7 Section
25958 broadly impairs not only the ability of immature minors to
obtain abortions, but also impairs the sexual privacy rights of mature
minors under the California Constitution, as stated in Ballard.29
Section 25958, in presuming the immaturity of all minors, burdens
all pregnant minors who do not wish to obtain parental consent with
the onus of proving their maturity to a juvenile court.299 On balance,
the state interests in the health and welfare of minors can not justify
this suffocation of the legitimate constitutional rights of mature
minors.3 0 The statute, by imposing the presumption of immaturity
on all minors is not the least offensive alternative necessary to achieve
California's interests.3 01 Section 25958 therefore should be invalidated
as unconstitutionally overbroad under the California Constitution.
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENT PROVISION
Although section 25958 is probably constitutional under the federal
constitutional standard,'3 2 and is probably unconstitutional under the
293. 1987 Cal. stat. ch. 1237, sec. I at-.
294. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 506, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
295. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8
(1971) (limiting abortion rights of minors to those minors of sufficient maturity to give
informed consent to the surgery).
296. 1987 Cal. stat. ch. 1237, sec. 1, at-.
297. Bagley, 65 Cal. 2d at 507, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
298. See Ballard, 4 Cal. 3d at 880, 484 P.2d at 1350, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
299. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1989).
300. See Ballard, 4 Cal. 3d at 873, 484 P.2d at 1352, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
301. See generally Comment, Aborting the Rights of Minors? Questioning the Constitu-
tionality of California's Parental Consent Statute, 19 PAc. L.J. 1487 (1988) (finding that
section 25958 unduly burdens mature minors and those minors for whom an abortion is in
their best interest).
302. See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
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California Constitution, 03 the California Legislature has had the
opportunity to consider less restrictive parental consent provisions.
For example, Assembly Bill 67 of the 1987 California Legislative
Session would likely pass muster under both constitutions. 304 That
bill, although defeated in the California Assembly, would have
meaningfully furthered the State's interest in protecting pregnant
minors and assuring family integrity. Importantly, the provisions of
1987 Assembly Bill 67 would have avoided dragging the most intimate
aspects of the lives of young women into court.
1987 Assembly Bill 67, like section 25958, would have required
pregnant unemancipated minors to procure the consent of their
parents to obtain abortions. 35 Like section 25958, the proposal would
have provided a means other than a parent's consent for minors to
obtain authorization for abortions. 30 The bill, however, would have
provided for the least offensive means necessary to facilitate the
state's interest in the welfare of minors.30 7 By meeting this third
prong of the Bagley-Myers test, the bill, if enacted, would have been
constitutional under the California Constitution.
30 8
Assembly Bill 67 would have provided that the alternate abortion
authorization could be provided by a unit within each county's child
welfare services agency instead of by a juvenile court. 319 A hearing
officer from the agency's staff would have met with a pregnant
minor 310 and either approve or deny the minor's abortion authori-
zation request upon determination of her maturity level and best
interest.311 Section 25958 fails to evince respect for the sexual privacy
of mature minors by presuming all minors who wish to obtain
abortions without procuring parental consent to be immature unless
they prove otherwise to a court.
312
Assembly Bill 67 would have prevented judges from using different
individual determinations of particular minors' "best interests" by
303. See supra notes 290-301 and accompanying text.
304. A.B. 67, 1986-87 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced Dec. 3, 1986) (the bill, authored
by Assemblyman Phil Isenberg, was significantly amended and eventually defeated in the
Assembly during the 1987 Legislative Session).
305. Id., sec. 2.
306. Id.
307. See Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 3d 499, 507, 421 P.2d 409,
415, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1966).




312. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b) (Vest Supp. 1989).
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specifying factors for making individual determinations.313 These
factors included: (1) Incest by a parent, or sexual activity between a
minor and her stepparents, guardian or others; (2) the abandonment
by, or absence of, the parents; (3) the existence of alcohol or drug
abuse; and (4) the existence of child abuse. 314 The county child
welfare services agency would have been required to assist a minor
to prepare her petition, advise her of the availability of appointed
counsel to represent her, and provide a guardian ad litem if necessary
to prevent a minor from being intimidated from presenting her case. 315
Additionally, 1987 Assembly Bill 67 would have required the agency
to take steps to ensure a minor's confidentiality and minimize any
psychological barriers a minor might encounter during the proceed-
ing.316 Section 25958 fails to provide guidelines for courts to use in
determining the "best interests" of pregnant minors. 31 7 Section 25958's
failure to provide uniform guidelines is also a failure to use the least
offensive means necessary to achieve the state's goal of protecting
the welfare of minors. 31 Judges are presumptively left to use any
means at hand to make this determination.
A statute with provisions like those in 1987 Assembly Bill 67 would
better achieve the state's purpose of caring for the best interests of
pregnant immature minors, and would provide the least offensive
alternative necessary to facilitate the state's interests. Provisions for
interviewing minors with social workers from a non-judicial agency
would be as effective, as the Bellotti II plurality noted, or even
superior to the comparable provision of section 25958.319 This method
of interviewing would probably allow for more accurate determina-
tions of the maturity or best interests of pregnant minors. A social
worker interviewing in an informal office setting seems more likely
to elicit candid and accurate information from a minor than could
a judge in a foreign and imposing courtroom.3 20




317. See CAL. H.ALTr & SAFETY CODE § 25958(b) (West Supp. 1989).
318. See Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 3d 499, 507, 421 P.2d 409,
415, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1966).
319. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 623, 643 n.22 (1979) ("Indeed, much can be said for
employing procedures and a forum less formal than those associated with a court of general
jurisdiction").
320. See id. at 645-55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (the minor's burden of appearing before a
court to obtain permission to have an abortion is "as great, if not greater than that imposed
on the minor to obtain her parent's consent").
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The state interest of advising all minors of the gravity of their
predicaments and their procreative options would also be served by
the provisions of a statute like 1987 Assembly Bill 67. A minor
would more likely understand and retain the information provided
in the less-intimidating atmosphere of a social worker's office than
in a courtroom. The requirement that minors meet these statutory
provisions would still accomplish the state's significant interest in
protecting the integrity of families3 21 by encouraging a pregnant minor
to discuss her pregnancy with a parent. A statute like 1987 Assembly
bill 67 would more likely pass muster under the California Consti-
tution because it better respects the rights of sexual privacy of
pregnant minors in California.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,
22 recognized
the psychological, emotional and social harm caused by restrictions
of a woman's ability to have an abortion. Similar restrictions on the
ability of minors to obtain the procedure can be equally if not more
severely devastating to pregnant minors, especially considering the
greater physical risks of teenage pregnancies. Yet California courts
will be under great political pressure by pro-life groups to find section
25958 valid under both the federal and California constitutions. The
courts should be sensitive to the position of section 25958 in the
forefront of attacks on women's procreative rights generally. "Those
charged with the responsibility of choice must avoid too myopic an
adherence to the matter at hand, recognizing that the ultimate results
of incremental change might be wholly alien, and perhaps profoundly
objectionable, to those who acquiesce step by step.
323
Section 25958 should be found valid under the federal Constitution.
The California Constitution, however, provides greater sexual and
health care privacy rights to all Californians, including minors. Under
the constitutional gauge established in Bagley v. Washington Town-
ship Hospital District and used in C.D.R.R. v. Myers, an enactment
that conditions the exercise of constitutional rights on statutory
requirements must be the least offensive alternative necessary to
achieve a legislative goal. Section 25958 does not meet this test.
321. See supra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
322. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
323. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions, INT'L. REv. Soc. Sci., 19, 23 (1966).
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California courts should therefore recognize the dangers section 25958
poses to the physical and mental health of minors as well as to the
abortion rights of all women, and invalidate the statute under the
California Constitution.
Gregory W. Herring
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